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ABSTRACT
This article makes a case for the capacity of “social practice” accounts of
agency and freedom to criticize, resist, and transform systemic forms of
power and domination from within the context of religious and political
practices and institutions. I first examine criticisms that Michel Fou-
cault’s analysis of systemic power results in normative aimlessness, and
then I contrast that account with the description of agency and innova-
tive practice that pragmatist philosopher Robert Brandom identifies as
“expressive freedom.” I argue that Brandom can provide a normative
trajectory for Foucault’s diagnoses of power and domination, helping to
resolve its apparent lack of ethical direction. I demonstrate that Fou-
cault, in turn, presents Brandom with insights that might overcome the
charges of abstraction and conservatism that his pragmatic inferential-
ism frequently encounters. The result is a vindication of social practice as
an analytical lens for social criticism that is at once both immanent and
radical.
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THE YEAR WAS 1979. The event was a New York University panel
discussion addressing feminist perspectives on “The Personal and the
Political.” Identifying herself as a black, lesbian, feminist, mother, poet,
and warrior, Audre Lorde rose to the podium and delivered a searing
indictment of what she characterized as an all-too-easy, white, North
American, academic feminism for its inattention to systemic forms of
subjugation extending beyond the margins of the Academy. She said,
Those of us who stand outside the circle of this society’s definition of
acceptable women; those of us who have been forged in the crucibles of
difference—those of us who are poor, who are lesbians, who are Black,
who are older—know that survival is not an academic skill. It is learning
how to stand alone, unpopular and sometimes reviled, and how to make
common cause with those others identified as outside the structures in
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order to define and seek a world in which we can all flourish. It is
learning how to take our differences and make them strengths. For the
master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house. They may allow
us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will never enable
us to bring about genuine change. And this fact is only threatening to
those women who still define the master’s house as their only source of
support [1984, 112].
Lorde’s words still resound today as a powerful caution to any attempt
to bring analysis to bear upon systemic forms of power and domination
inscribed in religious or political institutions and practices. In fact, her
language about “the master’s house” has come to serve as watch-words
for the claim that tools of resistance forged within prevailing practices,
structures, and institutions are ultimately unusable for the task of
overturning the hegemonic conditions that prevail there. Any such tool,
she suggests, will be so implicated in the very thing it seeks to
dismantle that its use will replicate the same conditions of domination,
though perhaps under a new guise. “What does it mean when the tools
of a racist patriarchy are used to examine the fruits of that same
patriarchy?” Lorde pressed the point: “It means that only the most
narrow perimeters of change are possible and allowable” (1984, 110–
11). In other words, the changes effected by such tools will take the
form of an intrinsically conservative reformism—changes either per-
mitted by or quickly assimilated to “the powers that be.” On this view,
genuine measures of resistance and liberation must come from some-
where else, somewhere “outside,” whether outside of “the canon,”
outside of mainstream Academia, outside of modern political institu-
tions, structures, and social processes, or perhaps from outside of
history altogether.
In this essay, I contest Lorde’s claim that “the master’s tools cannot
be used to dismantle the master’s house.” I do so by intervening in
recent debates about the capacity of “social practice” explanations of
agency and freedom to radically critique, resist, and transform sys-
temic forms of power and domination. Social practice accounts of
agency typically appeal to norms implicit in practices as critical lever-
age by which to administer immanent forms of criticism, and pursue
possibilities of resisting and transforming prevailing forms of power
and domination. Because the resources utilized by such accounts are
implicit in already existing practices and institutions, and because the
forms of criticism that they aim to facilitate are immanent, they appear
to invite Lorde’s criticism. Allegedly, they exemplify the conservative
reformism of “the master’s tools.” To address this issue, I take up the
accounts of social practice and strategies for resistance proposed by
Michel Foucault and pragmatist philosopher Robert Brandom, both of
whose accounts of practice, agency, and criticism appear to suffer in
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various ways from weaknesses that Lorde articulates. I propose read-
ings of Foucault and Brandom in which appropriating and reconfigur-
ing “the master’s tools” turns out to be a condition for the possibility of
systemic critique and resistant action that might disassemble and
genuinely transform “the master’s house.”
In Part 1, I examine Foucault’s attempt to fashion a social practice
framework for analyzing systemic forms of power. I begin by exploring
criticisms leveled by Nancy Fraser and Richard Rorty that Foucault’s
approach to analysis results in normative aimlessness, precisely because
it is at once systemic in its aims and immanent in its orientation—
because there is no position from which to critique power that is not itself
yet another manifestation of power. I propose to sidestep these criticisms
by reading Foucault’s account of “power as productive” against Bran-
dom’s social-practical account of “expressive freedom.” To this end, I
explicate Brandom’s account of social practice and the possibility of
expressive freedom through normative constraints, and then contrast it
with Foucault’s. My aim is to illuminate their respective weaknesses and
offer a modified proposal informed by the other’s best insights. I contend
that Brandom’s account of expressive freedom aids in answering the
criticisms of Foucault leveled by Fraser and Rorty, clarifying a norma-
tive trajectory for his diagnoses of power and domination, thereby
resolving the alleged ethical aimlessness of his account. Foucault, in
turn, presents Brandom with insights that force him to actually consider
questions of power and domination, and thereby to overcome charges
that his account issues in abstraction and conservatism. Both of these
interventions will serve to demonstrate the potential for social practice
explanations of agency and freedom to critique and resist systemic forms
of power and domination, thereby elucidating the capacity of “the
master’s tools to dismantle the master’s house.”
1. Foucault, Social Practice, and Normative Neutrality
of Power Analysis
Fraser credits Foucault’s work in the 1970s with reconceiving power
as productive rather than merely prohibitive or repressive. Rather
than administered by discrete, identifiable power holders and distri-
butors, Foucault reconceives power as “a complex, shifting field of
relations in which everyone is an element” (Fraser 1989, 29). Power is
“capillary”—“operating at the lowest extremities of the social body in
everyday social practices” (1989, 29). As a result, practices and power
are not separable entities that momentarily interact. Rather, power is
constitutive of social practices. It is inscribed upon “bodies, gestures,
desires, and habits” (1989, 29). For example, it is a conceptual feature
of language use that the normative constraints exerted by words and
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linguistic norms “enable us to speak precisely insofar as they constrain
us” (1989, 32). In other words, in order to say anything at all language
speakers submit themselves to the proprieties and exigencies that
constitute the language. “Such norms make communication possible,”
Fraser writes, “but only by devaluing and ruling out some possible and
actual utterances” (1989, 32). The force of language-constitutive norms
constrains language users. In constraining, these norms enable the
production of particular performances just as they rule out other
performances. As Fraser reads him, this is what Foucault means when
he writes of power in its productive sense.
Of course, to say that “power is productive” in this sense is to say that
power is everywhere and inescapable. Fraser describes this result as a
“normatively neutral” account of power. “[E]very power regime creates,
molds, and sustains a distinctive set of cultural practices, including
those oriented to the production of truth,” she writes. “It follows, in
[Foucault’s] view, that one cannot object to a form of life simply on the
ground that it is power-laden. Power is productive, ineliminable, and
therefore normatively neutral” (1989, 31). As Fraser sees it, the nor-
mative neutrality of Foucault’s account means that it lacks an explicit
normative orientation for either resisting the all-pervasiveness of
power, or even adjudicating between its various forms. In other words,
he lacks a basis for preferring one power regime or set of social practices
over another. While he occasionally calls for resistance to domination,
he provides no coherent means by which to orient such resistance. “Why
is struggle preferable to submission?” Fraser presses (Fraser 1989, 29).
“Why ought domination to be resisted? . . . Only with the introduction of
normative notions could he begin to tell us what is wrong with the
modern power/knowledge regime and why we ought to oppose it” (1989,
29). The result presents itself in Foucault’s work as a “one-sided,
wholesale rejection of modernity as such,” and this without any alter-
native with which to replace it (1989, 33).
Fraser’s charge finds an analogue in Rorty’s criticisms of Foucault.
Rorty pinpoints “a crippling ambiguity between ‘power’ as a pejorative
term and as a neutral, descriptive term” in Foucault’s work. This
ambiguity causes the term to “los[e] its contrastive force” and thereby
becomes “vacuous.” The result is not merely normative confusion,
according to Rorty, but tends toward “political anarchism” (1991, 195–
96). On one hand, for instance, Rorty agrees wholeheartedly with
Foucault’s claim that “the self” is “a contingent product of contingently
existing forces” (Rorty 1991, 197). However, he rejects Foucault’s claim
that it is, therefore, impossible to determine which of those “contingently
existing forces” and states of affairs are better, and which are worse—
“that every social institution is equally unjustifiable, that all of them are
on a par” because “all of them exert ‘normalizing power’ ” (1991, 197). As
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Rorty sees it, Foucault’s account of power pulls the rug out from under
any possibility of ameliorating actual, existing social conditions.
What matters most from Rorty’s point of view is “devising ways of
diminishing human suffering and increasing human equality” (1999,
5). He believes that the North American democratic experiment has
accomplished this task better than most other social and political
arrangements to date. “You would never guess, from Foucault’s account
of the changes in European social institutions during the last three
hundred years, that during that period suffering had decreased con-
siderably, nor that people’s chances of choosing their own styles of life
increased considerably” (1991, 195). For Foucault, every attempt to
identify and reform undesirable conditions will, itself, be implicated in
yet another form of the very power that it seeks to resist. From Rorty’s
point of view, this position presents a theoretical analogue to the
Christian doctrine of original sin—“the old religious idea that some
stains are ineradicable”; “the ubiquity of Foucauldian power is remi-
niscent of the ubiquity of Satan, and thus of the ubiquity of original
sin—that diabolical stain on every human soul” (1998, 95). The result
is a practical paralysis that rules out the possibility of actually improv-
ing concrete social conditions, and helps breed a dangerously debili-
tating form of theorized self-disdain. “Because [Foucauldians] regard
liberal reformist initiatives as symptoms of a discredited liberal
‘humanism,’ they have little interest in designing new social experi-
ments,” Rorty writes (1998, 37).
If the latter is true of Foucauldians, it was not entirely true of
Foucault himself. Peculiarly enough, at the point when Foucault was
most emphatic about the inescapability of power in his writings during
the late 1960s and 70s, he was also most politically active.1 Throughout
his career Foucault asserted that there is a “permanent and funda-
mental” connection between philosophy and theoretical analysis on
the one hand, and political activism on the other (1997, 293). Fraser
acknowledges Foucault’s persistent use of terms like “domination,”
“subjugation,” “struggle,” and “resistance,” suggesting that they hint at
a normative orientation implicit in his work. However, she claims that
Foucault lacks the resources necessary to make any such orientation
explicit. Assuming that Fraser’s observation is correct, how might
Foucault make such an orientation explicit and then develop it in ways
that would permit him to differentiate between better and worse forms
of social practices, institutions, and agency?
In his later interviews and lectures, Foucault considerably altered his
earlier claims about the nature of power and the contingencies of
1 For instance, Foucault became a vocal member of the Group on Prison Information,
a group that attacked the prison institutions and practices of criminal reform in France.
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personal identity. However, he held fast to his earlier view that “the self”
is not an essential something waiting to be uncovered. According to that
account, “selves” are historically local productions formed in relations of
power such as linguistic, institutional, economic, romantic, familial
relationships, formations, and fields. In its extreme form, this view
implied that selves are simply determined by anonymous and arbitrary
out-workings of bundles of power dynamics that happen to occur in a
given context. This view seemed to challenge the very possibility of
individual agency and responsibility. The subject was merely a “function
of discourse” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, Part 1). What appeared to be
individual agency was, in fact, more like a momentarily distinguishable
wave that swells across the underlying body of historical and social
formations, and was little more than an inseparable and fleeting
manifestation of them. In his later writings, Foucault refined his earlier
views about the self on precisely these points.
Foucault came to claim that while selves are not simply imaginary,
neither are they purely arbitrary extensions of whatever practical
and institutional forces produce them. They are, thus, not simply
determined—nor equally un-free—in all circumstances and contexts.
Rather, Foucault came to view the various relations of power in which
selves consist as “mobile, reversible, and unstable” (1997, 292). In other
words, the constraints and limitations exerted upon—even constitutive
of—a self in given historical circumstances and cultural locations
simultaneously enable possibilities for innovation and resistance
insofar as that self was intentionally, perhaps artistically, cultivated.
He came to think it possible to nurture or manipulate, to transgress
and unlearn, relations of power in caring for, and thereby—in effect—
creating, oneself. Alexander Nehamas clarifies this development in
Foucault’s understanding of the self,
The self may not be the final reality underlying history, but it is not
exactly a fiction either; and though it is not ultimately (or “metaphysi-
cally”) free, it is not exactly a puppet. Moreover, every form of power
. . . contains the potential of its own undoing, since every prohibition,
[Foucault] came to realize, creates the possibility of a new transgression.
Since power is productive, the subjects it produces, being themselves
forms of power, can be productive in their own right [1998, 177].
On the basis of these insights, Foucault came to speak of “self-creation”
in terms of a range of historically situated practices made possible by
all of the antecedent constraints of the time and place in question. He
came to view self-creation as a task that afforded a way of utilizing the
all-pervasive dynamics of power that he invested so much effort in
identifying in his earlier work. “From the idea that the self is not given
to us, I think that there is only one practical consequence: we have to
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create ourselves as a work of art,” he wrote. “Couldn’t everyone’s life
become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an art
object, but not our life?” (1984, 350).
As Foucault came to understand it, the goal of artistic self-fashioning
was not to identify some power-free location from which to resist power.
The point, rather, was to reflectively explore the possibilities of culti-
vating or manipulating the inescapable, historically contingent power
dynamics that make the self a self in the first place. Self-cultivation
meant that one would seek to “separate out, from the contingency that
has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or
thinking, what we are, do, or think.” This task would seek to “give a new
impetus . . . to the undefined work of freedom” (1984, 46).
This conception of self-cultivation rejected the idea of discovering
“who one truly is.” At the same time, it refused the notion that one can
invent one’s self ex nihilo. Rather, this task entailed “rearranging the
given” and “manipulating the dated” (Nehamas 1998, 177–78). More
specifically, it meant critically engaging the “models that [the subject]
finds in his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by
his culture, his society, and his social group” (Foucault 1997, 291).
“Self-creation” thus came to look like a decidedly artistic endeavor with
distinct ethical implications. Rather than a state of liberation from all
antecedent constraints, Foucault spoke of freedom as a range of prac-
tices by which one might cultivate one’s self in virtue of all the
constraints in and through which one lived and moved and had one’s
being. He came to speak of ethics as self-reflective development of one’s
engagement in these practices of self-cultivation (1997, 284).
Of course, if “becoming someone else” was the goal of self-creation,
the question quickly presented itself: Does it matter who or what one
becomes? Will any old possibility do so long as it is born of the
recognition of the historicity of the self one finds oneself to be and then
artistically endeavors to become?2 Foucault’s celebration of becoming
something other than what one happens to be again appeared to invite
the charge that his account lacks a normative orientation by which to
distinguish better and worse things to become. And yet, at this point in
his work, Foucault may actually have in place the resources necessary
for a normative orientation that Fraser accused him of lacking. In the
following segment, I make the case that the normative orientation
2 Foucault’s later thinking about self-creativity was fairly preliminary at the time of
his death. At that point he had begun to explore the ways “care of the self ” had been
practiced in Greek, Roman, and Christian contexts, in various forms of asceticism as well
as in the exploration and management of pain and pleasure. What is clear is that at no
point did he derive a distinct program for resistance in his work on the care of the self
(1997, 93–105). Todd May provides a helpful account of self-care in Foucault’s latest
work, and how it coheres with his genealogical work of the 1970s (1993, 111–28).
Freedom as Ethical Practice 425
provided by Brandom’s account of expressive freedom is not only
compatible with, and instructive for, Foucault’s account of the ethics of
self-creation, but in fact illuminates an ethical orientation already
implicit in that account.
2. Brandom and Freedom through Constraint by Norms
Much like Fraser’s reading of Foucault with which I opened the
previous section, Robert Brandom takes language use as paradigmatic
of what he finds most distinctive about essentially discursive,
vocabulary-mongering creatures such as ourselves. In particular, becom-
ing the speaker of a language is not simply learning to respond reliably
to specific situations by applying the correct phrase out of a set stock
(like the parrot trained to respond with the phrase “red car” each time
a red car passes the window in front of his cage). The human capacity to
apply concepts (paradigmatically, words) is marked by the capacity for
novelty. As Noam Chomsky has shown, most of the statements that a
given language user makes at any given point have never been uttered
before (1965, chap. 1). Even the phrases passed back and forth between
speakers in workaday exchange—“Have a nice day,” and “Please pass
the salt”—vary in meaning according to particular uses and in light of
contextual and situational specifics. Different collateral commitments
make the same string of words mean something slightly different in the
mouths of different speakers. Brandom calls this capacity for novelty
and innovation “expressive freedom” (1985, 186; 2000b, 17).
Expressive freedom is possible only through constraint by norms—
specifically, through the practical application (and perhaps eventual
mastery) of the proprieties that constitute a given practice. For instance,
the ostensibly boundless capacity that individual language users have to
say things never before said is possible only by virtue of the proprieties,
regularities, and norms that constitute language use. All of these are
constraints that make speaking possible in the first place (1985,
188–89). Expressive freedom occurs in performing the practice in new
ways—innovating, improvising, and thereby transforming the practice.
In principle, the practice will evolve like case law in the sense that
particular applications of the norms of the practice further enrich the
practice itself, as well as the capacities of the practitioner to perform the
practice. Occasionally these will converge to produce precedent-setting
instances of the practice, and practitioners, who transform the practice.
Take a musical example. The great jazz trumpeter Louis Armstrong
learned to play the trumpet in accord with of all the constraints of
tone, pitch, and musical grammar. He apprenticed himself to the best
trumpet players of his day like Joe “King” Oliver. And with increasing
adeptness—and eventual mastery—Armstrong came to improvise and
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innovate with the trumpet in ways never before seen or heard, ways
that transformed and expanded the practice. His playing set a practice-
transforming precedent by opening new and theretofore unheard pos-
sibilities for how a trumpet player could play and what trumpet
playing could sound like. He changed what it meant to be a virtuoso
trumpeter, jazz player, musician, and entertainer. Many of the trumpet
players that followed Armstrong emulated his virtuosity, perhaps in
hopes of surpassing mere imitation. The best of these sought to find
their own voice, fashion their own artistry, and thereby further expand
the expressive possibilities of the practice. These prospects for inno-
vation and transformation were possible by virtue of the flexibility of
the normative constraints implicit in (constitutive of) the practice. In
all this, Armstrong exemplified how a precedent-setting performance of
antecedently established practice can transform the practice itself, and
perhaps initiate new ones.
I should note at this point that the expressive freedom that
Brandom articulates does not fixate upon novelty and innovation. Such
freedom is “expressive” because it is also characterized by an increas-
ingly explicit and self-critical understanding and articulation of the
practices in question. Increasing adeptness at the practice is accom-
panied by increased capacity to become critically reflective about the
practice—to identify and make explicit the proprieties that implicitly
organize the practice. This puts practitioners in a position to subject
those proprieties—and the practice itself—to criticism, commentary,
contestation, and revision. To push the previous example forward, even
though in the 1950s Louis Armstrong would come to disparage Dizzy
Gillespie’s invention of Be-bop jazz trumpeting as so much “Chinese
music,” Gillespie’s innovation was as beholden to the influence of
Armstrong’s precedent as much as his playing radically transformed
and departed from that precedent. (“No him, no me,” Dizzy would say
on the occasion of Armstrong’s death.) Moreover, their occasionally
abrasive exchanges explicitly raised questions about what jazz was and
what it ought to be. Once explicit, the normative presuppositions
behind these questions—and the proprieties implicit in the practice
itself—became candidates for reflection, criticism, and modification or
transformation in ways that they had not been before.
Brandom presents an account of constraint and freedom similar
to Fraser’s reading of Foucault’s “productive power” as occurring in
the “simultaneously constraining and enabling . . . practice-governing
norms.” In Fraser’s example, the constraints constitutive of language
use “enable us to speak precisely insofar as they constrain us” (Fou-
cault 1989, 31–32). Brandom fashions a conception of freedom through
normative constraint comparable to Foucault’s, which he refers to as
“creative self-cultivation.” Brandom writes,
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Creative self-cultivation is possible only by means of the discipline of the
social practices which constrain one, just as the production of a poem
requires not only submission to the exigencies of a shared language, but
the stricter discipline of the poetic tradition as well. One must speak
some language to say anything at all, and the production and compre-
hension of novel performances requires a background of shared con-
straint [1985, 188–89].
Unlike Foucault, however, Brandom goes on to sketch out the social
and political implications of this account. He proposes that the capacity
for self-cultivation intrinsic to expressive social practices and practi-
tioners provides a normative orientation for distinguishing better and
worse types of constraints, and thus, social practices. Elsewhere
Brandom explains,
What matters about us morally, and so ultimately, politically is not
ultimately to be understood in terms of . . . the avoidance of mammalian
pain. It is the capacity each of us discursive creatures has to say things
that no-one else has ever said, things furthermore that would never have
been said if we did not say them. It is our capacity to transform the
vocabularies in which we live and move and have our being, and so to
create new ways of being (for creatures like us) [2000b, 178].
In other words, this normative substance of our social practices pro-
vides orientation for assessing the legitimacy of social and political
arrangements. Brandom clarifies,
Constraint of the individual by the social and political norms inherent in
communal practices may be legitimate insofar as that constraint makes
possible for the individual an expressive freedom which is otherwise
impossible for him. . . . Political constraint is illegitimate insofar as it is
not in the service of the cultivation of the expressive freedom of those
who are constrained by it [1985, 188–89].
As the above passages indicate, Brandom avoids moving directly to the
utilitarian calculus for the purposes of normative orientation. In other
words, he sidesteps (at least initially) the kind of question that Rorty
takes to be primary: has the sum total of human suffering (construed
as mammalian pain) decreased in our society over the past century?
Brandom would first ask questions like—have our political and social
arrangements facilitated the cultivation of possibilities for novel per-
formances of received practices? Have they fostered the capacities of
communities and individuals to engage in, critically reflect upon, and
thereby revise, expand, or alter those practices? Have those practices
been expanded to recognize a broader range of practitioners and
encompass increasingly diverse understandings and transformation
of the practice itself? Ostensibly, Brandom could apply the same
428 Journal of Religious Ethics
questions to Foucault’s conception of self-creation as criteria for iden-
tifying better and worse instances of self-creation.
Of course, even if Brandom’s account here opens up a potential vista
to a normative orientation for distinguishing between better and
worse, acceptable and unacceptable sets of social practices and social
and political norms, he leaves the political implications of his account
woefully underdeveloped in his work. In other words, if Foucault errs
in the direction of identifying the inescapability of power and domina-
tion in all social practices, Brandom errs in the direction of neglecting
the ways that the social practices of which he writes are inscribed with
systemic inequalities that often give rise to states of domination. In
fact, Rorty suggests that Brandom’s account of expressive freedom
positively invites charges of “pseudo-aristocratic condescension and
ivory-tower aestheticism” (2000, 189). Rorty writes,
[Brandom] courts [these charges] when he sympathizes with my sugges-
tion that ‘our overarching public purpose should be to ensure that a
hundred private flowers blossom.’ He courts [these charges] . . . when he
goes on to say that ‘pain, and like it various sorts of social and economic
deprivation, have a second-hand, but nonetheless genuine, moral signifi-
cance’ [2000, 189].
Notice that giving Brandom’s notion of expressive freedom primacy
of place as a criterion of assessment does not preclude attending to
considerations of mammalian pain, or viewing such assessments as
necessary to expressive freedom. In fact, freedom from mammalian
pain is requisite for the cultivation of expressive freedom, just as
certain basic physical and biological conditions are necessary for basic
human survival and flourishing. Using expressive freedom as a nor-
mative gauge does preclude reducing our criteria for assessment to the
sum total of human suffering. Nonetheless, Rorty’s concern about the
liability of assigning mammalian pain and suffering a secondary place
raises important considerations. Does expressive freedom have a suf-
ficiently sharp normative edge to accomplish what Brandom wants it
to? Is Brandom’s appeal to bildung (creative self-cultivation) yet
another variation of privileged, bourgeois reformism? Lorde will
suspect that expressive freedom is insufficiently radical in that it seeks
to transform practices and institutions “from within.” Can Brandom’s
account accommodate revolutionary praxis—the radical overturning of
alienated conditions? This suspicion is all the more pressing because it
might come not only from those who affirm that truly radical criticism
must come from “outside,” but also from thinkers who avow immanent
forms of criticism as well. On precisely this basis, African liberation
theologian Emmanuel Martey counters Lorde’s repudiation of the
master’s tools in a way markedly different from the immanent forms of
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resistance Brandom proposes. “Unlike Audrey Lorde, who might be
wondering whether the master’s tools could indeed be used to dis-
mantle the master’s house, African theologians are fully convinced that
the gun, in efficient hands, could well kill its owner” (Martey 1994, 46).
A trumpet is not a gun. This banal observation is worth stating only
in order to highlight the crucial distinction that these images convey in
the present context—namely, the difference between the pretensions
of revolutionary praxis and the resistant and transformative potential
of expressive freedom. The former seeks to annihilate the conditions of
mastery (and, ostensibly, the master along with them) in order to
reconstitute altogether the context and self. Expressive freedom, by
contrast, proposes to transform the conditions of mastery through
innovative appropriation and application of the antecedent norms and
structures, thereby converting the master to a position of non-mastery.
The revolutionary impulse is exemplified by Jean Paul Sartre’s claims
in the context of the Algerian War of Liberation against French colonial
occupation that the colonized subject can reclaim and reconstitute his
true humanity from subjugation only by exorcizing the colonizer. Thus
Sartre writes that “killing a European is killing two birds with one
stone, eliminating in one go oppressor and oppressed: leaving one man
dead and the other man free” (quoted from Fanon 1963, lv). Here the
master’s tools (the colonizer’s gun and the violence by which he
colonized) are necessary instruments for the eradication of the master’s
house.
Of course, Sartre’s prescription for re-creation of one’s self through
exorcism of one’s oppressor presupposes Sartre’s conception of “the
self”—a self that is free only apart from, and in spite of, normative
constraints external and antecedent to it. Such a self “surges up in the
world—and defines itself afterwards” (Sartre 1956, 290–91). On this
account, one extricates oneself from constraints through an act of
self-creation conceived of as an assertion of one’s will. “The Other” is
the source of restriction (“Hell is other people,” Garcin famously
concludes in No Exit). Sartre’s conception is emblematic of a self that
is authentic insofar as it unbinds itself from the context in which it
lives and moves and has its being by projecting itself into the future in
the interests of self-creation and emancipation. On such a view, anni-
hilation of “the Other” is a viable—if not occasionally necessary—
means for relieving one’s self of external constraints. Transposed into
Sartre’s prescriptions for Algerian resistance to the French, “the colo-
nized are cured of colonial neurosis by driving the colonist out by force”
(quoted from Fanon 1963, lv).3
3 Foucault contrasts Sartre’s conception of “self ” to his own account of self-creation in
“On the Genealogy of Ethics” (1997, 262).
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Sartre’s account of freedom and constraint provides an instructive
contrast to Brandom’s. Brandom rereads Hegel’s account of normative
constraints as generated when social actors hold one another account-
able in mutual recognition. In fact, selves become synthesized in
inescapably normative encounters of mutual recognition. As Brandom
explicates Hegel, “To call something a self” is “to treat it as an I, is to
take up an essentially normative attitude toward it. It is to treat it as
a subject of commitments, as something that can be responsible—hence
as a potential knower and agent” (2002, 216). The engagement occurs
as reciprocal responsibility of practitioner to practitioner, and the
accountability of all the practitioners to the norms constitutive of the
practice in question. It is the norm-laden form of sociality that makes
social interaction possible and makes a practice a practice in the first
place. So understood, mutual recognition is an essentially social
achievement. One becomes an “I” by recognizing another—“a Thou”—
and, in turn, being recognized. However, while selves are synthesized
in mutual recognition, this does not reduce “selfhood” to a product of
intersubjective consensus. Mutual recognition is a normative engage-
ment in the important sense that it is something about which any
participant in the engagement (or everyone) can be right or wrong, can
misrecognize another.
Say, for instance, that some “I” who recognizes other “Thous” as
agents responsible for their attitudes and claims, and to whom he or
she is responsible in turn, is refused recognition in return as a Thou.
Say that she is recognized as an “It”—an object. Perhaps she is
recognized as communicating and interacting with others in a deriva-
tive sense, and is ascribed something analogous to the status of a
household pet or livestock. In a political framework that systematically
denies the possibility of some group’s capacity to participate in the
practices of mutual recognition, each member of that group would be
recognized not as an “I” or “Thou” but would be designated an “It.”
They would suffer some degree of what Orlando Patterson has called
“social death”—a status that Patterson finds exemplified in practices of
chattel slavery in the United States (2005, 5–9, 38–45, 337; see also
Rawls 1996, 32–33). A society characterized by slave institutions and
practices is predicated upon misrecognizing a group of people as
lacking the basic capacities that make expressive freedom possible.
Frequently, such institutional frameworks are structured in ways that
intend to prohibit opportunities for the expressive freedom of those
consigned to the status of sub- or nonhuman.
Of course, one might press, often in such frameworks expressive
freedom has flourished among parties whose capacities for expressive
freedom have been systematically denied. It was, for instance, in the
context of slavery and Jim Crow in the United States that expressive
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forms like spirituals, the blues, and jazz were born and thrived among
the black population, as did improvisational religious practices such as
“call and response” and the rhetorical extemporization of black preach-
ers. In these contexts, was it not the repressive and inhumane con-
straints of slave-owning practices that made “possible for the
individual an expressive freedom which is otherwise impossible for
him” (Brandom 1985, 188)? Does the fact that these forms of expressive
innovation occurred within political and social frameworks predicated
upon slavery legitimate that framework? If so, does not Brandom’s
notion of “expressive freedom as part of a process of cultivation of the
self and of the community” lend legitimacy to that social and political
framework?
Again, the institution of slavery and the cultural and political
frameworks that sustained it were predicated upon systematic refusals
to recognize a particular group’s capacity for expressive freedom.
Moreover, the dominant practices and institutions within this frame-
work produced and disseminated certain forms of knowledge that
sustained those conditions. Many people living in the American slave-
owning culture thought it quite self-evident that the creatures in
question were less than fully human, created for labor, and thus to be
property. The political framework instituted certain practices and
prohibitions in order to perpetuate these understandings. Slaves were
prohibited from religious instruction for more than a century. Once
permitted to adopt the master’s religion, they were usually subjected to
accounts of it that perpetuated the master’s understandings. Slave-
holders deployed their own religious practices in innovative ways in
order to perpetuate these understandings. Their practices of reading
Christian Scripture, for instance, claimed that Jesus sanctioned the
institution of slavery in his own day by having interacted with slaves
lovingly, yet without ever condemning the institution itself. They
claimed that God created a race of slaves by cursing Noah’s son Ham,
and invoked St. Paul’s charge that slaves should obey their masters
(Cannon 1996, 40–46). Slave masters justified slavery as a means of
“converting the African heathen” to Christianity, portraying faithful
service to one’s master as the surest way to be faithful to one’s
heavenly Master (Raboteau 1978, chap. 6).
In such a framework, the realization of expressive freedom on the
part of those misrecognized and excluded as practitioners does not
legitimate the framework. Rather, those instances of expressive
freedom occur in spite of the best efforts of that framework to prohibit
them and deny their possibility. As such, they constitute acts of
resistance and critique. They challenge the legitimacy of the dominant
framework by challenging the stories and understandings and legal
practices used to legitimate and perpetuate it. In many cases they do
432 Journal of Religious Ethics
this by appropriating the dominant practices and transforming them
by employing their elements for different ends and in different con-
texts. James Cone points out, for example, that the negro spirituals
and the blues grew out of the stories and characters from the Christian
Scriptures (2004). In some cases, slaves directly appropriated hymns
from the master’s hymnbook, and stories from the master’s Scriptures,
and resituated them in the context of the work fields and slave
congregations, or in the secrecy of slave quarters and “hush harbor”
worship services. So resituating them radically altered their meanings.
They became tools for coping and survival by being recast in ways that
captured in song the sounds of the suffering, longing, and hope of the
slaves in the fields. Eugene Genovese argues in his monumental text,
Roll, Jordan, Roll, that for the individual slave, the stories of Jesus
relativized the master’s authority (1974). They “placed a master above
his own master and thereby dissolved the moral and ideological ground
on which the very principle of absolute human lordship must rest”
(1974, 165). Just as importantly, “The religion practiced in the quarters
gave the slaves the one thing they absolutely had to have if they were
to resist being transformed into the Sambos they had been pro-
grammed to become. It fired them with a sense of their own worth
before God and man” (1974, 165).
Appropriations and innovative applications of stories and hymns
from the master’s religion also provided subversive tools when
deployed as coded speech that facilitated passage along the Under-
ground Railroad (Blount 1995). In each of these cases, the master’s
tools were innovatively appropriated and improvisationally employed,
enabling the practitioners to “use the master’s tools to dismantle the
master’s house.” Such examples illustrate how the norms that make
expressive freedom possible are everywhere, and can be employed in
novel, improvisational, and resistant ways. Moreover, in the process,
new traditions of creative expression were created. Appropriation and
application of the master’s tools did not merely permit periodically
“beating the master at his own game.” They also made possible
resisting the game, and in time altering and transforming it in fun-
damental ways along with the very tools that they appropriated and
applied.
The legacy of slavery in the United States is one rather stark example
of the kind of political framework for which Brandom’s account is
relevant when he claims that a political framework is illegitimate
insofar as it is “not in service to the cultivation of expressive freedom of
those who are constrained by it” (1985, 188–89). At first glance, this
might seem to apply the account to an exceedingly easy test case. Do we
need an account to provide a normative trajectory away from chattel
slavery? Is not the path beyond such utter dehumanization of other
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people fairly self-evident? In the contemporary United States, slave
institutions and practices are no longer considered to be morally or
socially acceptable or legal. Does this mean that the forms of domination
and power that they quite publicly manifest have ceased to exist? The
comforting sense that such is the case betrays the fact that the legacy of
slavery and the ensuing era of Jim Crow remain alive in insidious and
pervasive forms. Foucault describes these forms as invisibly inscribed
upon our bodies and souls and shot through our personalities, desires,
and the languages we speak.
The explicit institutions of chattel slavery in the United States have
ceased to exist, as well as many of the more explicit forms of domina-
tion, suffering, and mammalian pain that accompanied those institu-
tions. But this is precisely the point at which expressive freedom
provides a helpfully trenchant mode of assessment. For, if we gauge the
adequacy and justness of present conditions exclusively by the sum
total decrease of mammalian pain relative to the days in which chattel
slavery was a central institution in our society, then severe forms of
domination and inequality will remain insidiously invisible. Black
people and people of color, and the poorest and most at risk, continue
to struggle for full inclusion in North American and European societies
that have long outlawed slavery. Yet many struggle for recognition as
full participants in institutions and practices subtly coded by race,
sexuality, class, and age that often most directly affect them. For many
of these, the forms of expressive freedom that they exercise—in spite of
structures and conditions that would prohibit them—operate as strat-
egies and tactics for bare survival and minimal resistance. As an ideal
point of normative orientation, expressive freedom will serve not just
as bare existence and minimal resistance, but as the ends of the
cultivation and expansion of human flourishing.
Holding the lens of expressive freedom up to Foucault’s latest
writing helps to illuminate the normative orientation for power analy-
sis that he was beginning to articulate at the time of his death. In his
latest work, Foucault moved into a position that, at once, accommo-
dates the best insights of Brandom’s account of expressive freedom,
and supplements its deficiencies by its unrelenting focus on the micro-
operations of power and domination. Foucault rephrased his earlier
claim that “you see power everywhere, thus there is no room for
freedom” to read “if there are relations of power in every social field,
this is because there is freedom everywhere” (1997, 292). On this
understanding, freedom is not merely a possibility, but a necessity that
opens the way for multiple possibilities. Freedom understood as
“ethical practice” becomes possible, according to Foucault, not in spite
of but as a necessary correlate to inescapable relations of power. In
fact, Foucault goes so far as to claim that the very possibility of
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relations of power presupposes freedom—that freedom is “the ontologi-
cal condition of ethics” (1997, 292). Foucault explained this complex
relation this way:
[I]n power relations there is necessarily the possibility of resistance
because if there were no possibility of resistance (of violent resistance,
flight, deception, strategies capable of reversing the situation), there
would be no power relations at all. . . . [P]ower relations are possible only
insofar as the subjects are free. If one of them were completely at the
other’s disposal and became his thing, an object on which he could wreak
boundless and limitless violence, there wouldn’t be any relations of
power. Thus, in order for power relations to come into play, there must be
at least a certain degree of freedom on both sides [1997, 292].
At this point Foucault’s position is quite close to Brandom’s. To be an
agent is to be constrained as a user of norms. To be a user of norms is
to have the capacity (in principle) to resist prevailing practices and
structures of domination by utilizing the normative constraints consti-
tutive of the practices and structures. In fact, these constraints pre-
suppose freedom for their very existence. To render the other as a
“thing,” as Foucault describes it here, is analogous to the kind of social
death that occurs when a Thou is recognized merely as an It in the
terms of Brandom’s I/Thou account. This would require the eradication
of the capacity for expressive freedom altogether. As we saw in the case
of chattel slavery above, it would result in social death.
Of course, at times, the most freedom that ethical practice makes
possible is tactics of resistance for momentarily transgressing
domination—miniscule cracks and fissures in the edifice of the mas-
ter’s house. Foucault explains,
In a great many cases, power relations are fixed in such a way that they
are perpetually asymmetrical and allow an extremely limited margin of
freedom. To take what is undoubtedly a very simplified example, one
cannot say that it was only men who wielded power in the conventional
marital structure of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; women had
quite a few options: they could deceive their husbands, pilfer money from
them, refuse them sex. Yet they were still in a state of domination insofar
as these options were ultimately only stratagems that never succeeded in
reversing the situation. In such cases of domination, be they economic,
social, institutional, or sexual, the problem is knowing where resistance
will develop [1997, 292–93].
Such cracks and fissures may remain short-lived and incidental. They
might also give way to larger rifts and gaping holes. In any case,
Foucault’s later account of freedom as ethical practice—and of the care
of the self as an ethical practice in particular—retains his concern with
the systemic and immanent character of power analysis. Brandom’s
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account of expressive freedom helps us see that power analysis need
not jeopardize a normative orientation by which to discern better and
worse states of affairs or the possibility of agency (however slim)
through which to resist those states of affairs. In the final section of
this paper, I consider several objections to the social-critical potential
of expressive freedom and self-creation.
3. Objections and Replies
Demonstrating the normative orientation for critique and agency for
resistance at a theoretical level will invite objections at the level of
practical application. It will be claimed, for instance, that the innova-
tion and improvisation made possible by expressive freedom could be
assimilated by the circumstances of domination, and applied in ways
that (however inadvertently) perpetuate and aid those circumstances.
It was about such a reality that the American sociologist and social
critic W. E. B. Du Bois wrote about in his book The Souls of Black Folk,
originally published in 1903, when he described black people in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century United States as “born with a
veil”—a “double consciousness”: “this American world . . . yields him no
true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the
revelation of the other world” (2003, 5). Du Bois continues,
It is a peculiar sensation, this double consciousness, this sense of always
looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul
by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One
ever feels his twoness—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts,
two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose
dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder [2003, 5].
With these words Du Bois identified conditions of self-loathing
inscribed (often tacitly) in the personalities, upon the bodies, and
self-conceptions of the people most disadvantaged in the white-
supremacist ethos of the United States. His notion of double conscious-
ness points toward the ways that expressive freedom might be co-opted
and deployed in ways that perpetuate states of domination. So, for
example, while Armstrong remains one of the premier innovators in the
history of jazz, in the eyes of many of his fellow musicians, all of his
genius and transformative impact upon that art form never fully
escaped its service to the prevailing conception of what a black enter-
tainer could be and should do within a social and political context
predicated upon white supremacy. In terms of Lorde’s trope, in other
words, Armstrong became a house entertainer for the master—
applauded and admired so long as he fulfilled the master’s expectations
and kept his customers satisfied. For all its beauty and expressiveness,
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such innovation and improvisation exemplify the oppressors “keep[ing]
the oppressed occupied with the master’s concerns” (Lorde 1984, 113).
Similarly, Frantz Fanon wrote disdainfully of the intellectuals among
the colonized who had absorbed “the manners and forms of thought”
from the colonialist bourgeoisie (Fanon 1963, 38–39). He thought that
they had been insufficiently traumatized by the struggle for liberation.
Their assimilated selves remained largely intact and, thus, in service to
their colonizers. Do these concerns lead us back to Fraser’s criticism of
Foucault with which we began, namely, with the claim that power so
suffuses all practices that there can be no way to critique, resist, and
transform it? Is a double consciousness or assimilated self inescapable
for those who are subjugated or have suffered under colonialism? Is any
innovativeness thereby forced to reflect and perpetuate the master’s
rules and the master’s system, even if in a novel formulation?
It is at this point that Brandom’s account of expressive freedom
provides a crucial addition to Foucault’s account. As we saw above,
Brandom identifies the general result of expressive freedom as the
ability to perform the practice in question in ways never before seen or
heard and, thereby, contribute to the transformation of that practice
(toward the end of new possibilities of what practices there are and
what practitioners might be). Again, this entails the expressive capac-
ity of making explicit the norms implicit in the practices and subjecting
them to examination and criticism. Such critical explication makes
those norms candidates for critical inspection and revision. From the
vantage point of expressive freedom, then, it is no trivial occurrence
that the assimilation of Armstrong’s genius into mainstream, white
supremacist culture was a point of contention between Armstrong and
Dizzy, Miles Davis and John Coltrane—at least as much as their
musical differences. The social and political implications of their music
and musicianship—along with the terms under which they were
praised and admired—all became objects of critical reflection and
contestation. The arguments that ensued highlighted the ways that
their practices were bound up with—and beholden to—various insti-
tutions, and laced with certain insidious dynamics of power. Jazz
musicians and critics brought the institutional modes of exploitation to
the level of conscious reflection (for instance, so-called “junkie labels,”
such as “Prestige,” came to be known as “plantations” for underpaying
musicians in small bills cash to make it easier for them to get from fix
to fix) (Nisenson 1995, 66). They questioned why black musicians were
prohibited from recording with whites early on, and what parts they
were permitted to play or sing when such collaboration was later
permitted. Illuminating the conditions that made the practice possible,
the institutional structures that sustained it, as well as the implica-
tions of the practice were means of critically interrogating the past and
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innovating forward in increasingly explicit and self-reflective forms of
awareness and resistance. Any innovative move that did not facilitate
opening up the practice to critical scrutiny, and thus to transformation,
did not contribute to genuine freedom.
Even so, some will say that the possibility of deliberative assessment
of explicated norms implicit in practices remains at a potentially
troubling level of abstraction. Critical tasks of holding one another
accountable to the inferential proprieties of their claims and commit-
ments often takes the form of a “disembodied logic of immanent
critique” (Connolly 2001, 11). Moreover, it often deposits these tasks in
the hands of professional logicians and philosophers trained to expli-
cate and examine the logic implicit in ordinary practices. Brandom
opens himself to this charge when he suggests that, because “making
explicit what is implicit in concept-use generally is precisely the
expressive role distinctive of logical vocabulary,” it follows that “the
road to ethics is paved with logic” (2000a, 372).4 If that is the case, such
heavy reliance upon the tasks of deliberative explication risks passing
over both the potential validity and the intransigence of “tacit” forms
of knowledge such as sedimented intuitions, feelings, and perceptions
that often resist explication, as well as the usefulness of nondelibera-
tive modes of expression for purposes of resistance. As a result, the
deliberative character of expressive freedom risks missing the full
gravity of Du Bois’s point about forms of self-loathing and disdain for
the shape of one’s body and skin color, which resist correction through
deliberative interrogation, even after having been identified and made
explicit. Embodiment is messy; the prejudices, intuitions, and desires
that participate in actors’ normative attitudes become entrenched, and
do not easily respond to conceptual explication, deliberative interroga-
tion, and willed adjustment. At the same time, acquiring an increas-
ingly self-reflective and critical awareness of a practice might take
forms other than the logical explication of inferential proprieties.
Foucault, by contrast, pointed out time and again that the norms of
practices are inscribed upon our bodies as much as they are shot
through the words we use and ways we speak. They configure the
spaces in which we live and move and the practices and institutions in
and through which we dwell. These manifest themselves as habits and
dispositions that often simply are not amenable to adjustment on the
basis of explication, criticism, and argument. William Connolly pro-
vides an example to amplify the point:
4 Brandom does not fully endorse this characterization, but sets it forth as a possible
reading of his project in Making It Explicit that will most likely appeal to Habermas.
Hence, this criticism may be better addressed to Habermas’s project. For Habermas’s
assessment of Brandom’s project, see Habermas 2000, 322–55.
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Suppose you become wary of the sense of disgust or panic you feel in your
gut when, say, atheists or gays articulate their orientations to death,
marriage, or sex in public forums. The gut, we now know, contains a
simple cortical organization; and the cultural transactions through which
it is organized issue in thought-imbued intensities that make powerful
claims upon your habits, actions, and intellectual judgments. Such heart-
felt intuitions may not be movable by will or deliberation a lot, then. But
they might yield a little to arts of the self and micropolitical practices
that enact new versions of those interactions between sound, feeling,
image, touch, concept, and belief through which the intuitions were
organized in the first place [2001, 11].
Connolly’s insight here about the often extreme difficulty in refashion-
ing one’s self fits more readily with Foucault’s notion of “micro-politics”
of the self than with Brandom’s appeal to the logical explication and
interrogation of norms implicit in practices and cultivation of expres-
sive capacities. Of course, if this is a particular strength of Foucault’s
analysis, Charles Taylor points out that he never employs that
strength at the level of association in common action. The politics of
“self-creation” remained for Foucault “a completely solo operation, the
achievement of lone virtuosi, who could learn from each other but did
not need to associate with each other” (2001, 94–95). If Brandom’s
account can be made to accommodate Foucault’s attention to the
micropolitical dimension of self-cultivation, it might have the virtue of
expanding that insight and applying it at the level of social and
political frameworks.
To be fair, the term “deliberation” is insufficient by itself to capture
the full scope of the irreducibly social character of expressive freedom.
Brandom draws the sphere of the “discursive” inclusively. This means
that nonlinguistic moves such as all forms of perception and action are
inferentially significant. They interweave with explicitly inferential
practices of logical deliberation as “entryways” into and “exits” from
chains of reasoning and speech.5 This means that what I attend to in a
given context, how I pay attention to what is going on around me, and
the ways that I act and interact in response to those goings-on are all
discursively part and parcel of the deliberative practices that Brandom
describes. It cannot be denied that Brandom does little to explicitly
develop the implications for embodiment and a spatial situation of the
embedded character of his inferentialism. However, because observa-
tion and embodied action are both part of the substance of discursive
formation and activity, Brandom’s account is, in principle at least,
5 See Sellars 1991, 321–58; Brandom 1994, 330–33, 618–32; and Stout 2002, 25–52.
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amenable to explicit attention to embodiment, spatial configurations,
and all forms of perceptual and contextual considerations.6
Of course, if Brandom’s account attends to community concerns
while Foucault’s does not, we must see if it can avoid erring in the
opposite direction and losing any sense of the individual. Brandom
anticipates such an objection when he addresses “I-we” accounts of
social practices (1994, 593–601, especially 599). On such accounts, the
individual (I) stands individually over against the composite collection
of individuals that takes the form of the community (we). Here,
consensus of the community based upon intersubjective agreement
cannot provide a final authoritative perspective. Rather, both commu-
nal consensus and individual claims are accountable to the norms
implicit in the practices as well as the practical and empirical con-
straints that fill out the context (1994, 631–32).
Consider, for instance, the extemporaneous speech delivered by the
black abolitionist, Sojourner Truth, to the Women’s Rights Convention
in Akron, Ohio, in May 1851. On that occasion Sojourner Truth rose to
the podium and addressed the audience in the face of protests from
many of the white women there who feared having their cause mixed
up with blacks and abolitionism (“Don’t let her speak Mrs. Gage. It’ll
ruin us!” several insisted). According to Frances Gage’s observational
account of the event, from the perspectives of most in attendance that
day, Truth was to be either lumped in with the general category of
“women” by those who were willing to include her in their struggle for
recognition, or she was to be excluded from the relevant sense of that
category altogether because she was black and had been a slave. In this
context, her very act of rising to the podium was a discursive incision
in the deliberative engagement.
Truth first responded to the white Protestant ministers who had
addressed the convention the previous day. She began by selecting from
among the resources they had invoked, yet was using their reasons to
challenge their conclusions, holding them accountable to the substance
of their own commitments and affirming her own conclusions as
correct. One had claimed that the biblical witness commends that
women should have fewer rights than men because “Christ wasn’t a
woman”: “Whar did your Christ come from?” Truth responded, “From
God and a woman! Man had nothin’ to do wid Him” (Buhle and Buhle
1978, 104). She addressed a second objection that claimed that women
were the fairer and frailer sex, and thus their status should be
contingent upon that of men. With this response she replied both to
6 For trenchant criticism of Brandom’s project along these lines, see Rouse 2002,
210–33, especially 222–25.
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those who would assimilate her to a general category of “woman,” and
to those who would exclude her altogether:
‘Dat man ober dar say dat womin needs to be helped into carriages, and
lifted ober ditches, and to hab de best place everywhar. Nobody eber helps
me into carriages, or ober mud-puddles, or gibs me any best place!’ And
raising herself to her full height, and her voice to a pitch like rolling
thunder, she asked. ‘And ain’t I a woman? Look at me! Look at my arm!
(and she bared her right arm to the shoulder, showing her tremendous
muscular power). I have ploughed, and planted, and gathered into barns,
and no man could head me! And ain’t I a woman? I could work as much and
eat as much as a man—when I could get it—and bear de lash as well! And
ain’t I a woman? I have borne thirteen chilern, and seen ‘em mos’ all sold
off to slavery, and when I cried out with my mother’s grief, none but Jesus
heard me! And ain’t I a woman?’ [Buhle and Buhle 1978, 104].
Truth’s response assuages two persistent concerns about immanent
criticism. First, it exemplifies how immanent criticism need not take
the form of philosophical “logic-chopping.” In this instance, Truth
challenges and corrects her interlocutors’ misrecognition of her in an
immanent fashion. Specifically, she invokes her body as a black slave,
her experiences as a mother whose children had been sold into slavery,
Christian Scripture, and the fact that her grief and anguish—even if
refused recognition by white masters—was not refused recognition by
Jesus. This is anything but “logic-chopping immanent critique.” This
encounter might be redescribed as Truth challenging her interlocutors
on the basis of the norms implicit in the practice of mutual recognition,
saying—again, in effect—“You may think that you have deliberated
effectively by factoring my standpoint into your assessments” (either by
absorbing it into a general category of “woman” or excluding it alto-
gether with the qualifications of “black” and “slave”). “However, here is
how my standpoint defies your claims and commitments—and ‘Ain’t I
a woman?’ ” For her purposes of correcting the uses of the word
“woman” that prevailed in that situation it was no less discursively
significant that Truth “bared her right arm to the shoulder, showing
her muscular power” as it was that she coupled that action with the
explicit edge of the question—“Ain’t I a woman?” Her body entered into
the deliberation in a way highlighted by Foucault’s account, but only
implied by Brandom’s.
Second, Truth’s speech demonstrates that a social-practical account
of critical deliberation does not lose the individual in a morass of
intersubjective consensus about what is or is not, should or should not
be, the case. Rather, Truth’s was an instance of a lone voice standing
against the consensus prevailing in a deliberative encounter and
saying, in effect, “I am right and everyone else here is wrong!” and,
indeed, being correct about it. The normative traction of her claim
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came from the norms internal to the practice in question as well as
from those implicit in the commitments of her fellow participants.
Every perspective is accountable to these normative constraints,
including the deliberative (intersubjective) consensus of the group
itself.7
Truth’s address that day in 1851 has been far more than a crack
along the foundation of the white supremacist, misogynistic house of
the master in the United States in the intervening century and a half.
Her indictment has proved to be at least as searing, incisive, persua-
sive, and inspiring as Lorde’s remark about the master’s house would be
roughly a century later. When read through the lens of expressive
freedom, it models how the I/Thou encounter avoids investing the
community—or even a prevailing consensus—with unassailable author-
ity, and thereby losing the individual in a tangle of intersubjectivity. It
is crucial to note here that this is not a recipe for the celebration of
standing particularities and, thus, a tolerant multiculturalism or poli-
tics of difference. On this point, Lorde is correct that the talk of
“toleration of difference” so common in the mainstream Academy in
recent decades amounts to easy reformism. “Difference”—understood as
the normative particularity of the individual perspective—is a basis for
resistance. It is a central feature of a framework of discursive exchange
based upon accountability and judgment, and thus (plausibly) confron-
tation and agonism. It is a framework within which each voice and
perspective can, in principle, challenge any (and potentially every)
other participant in the exchange.
Of course, in practice, there is no perfectly level discursive playing
field. And, in spite of the potential for Brandom’s thought to be
expanded in the above directions, clearly it needs something like
Foucault’s unrelenting attentiveness to the forms of domination and
inequalities inscribed within—and perpetuated by—the very expres-
sive practices that Brandom explicates. If I am right about the ways
that their projects might be utilized to supplement one another, then
the work of freedom—while “undefined”—is not without direction.
Freedom becomes aware of itself as ethical practice (Foucault 1997,
286–87).
Some inquiring skeptic will want to know why “freedom” is to be
preferred to oppression from the vantage point of expressive freedom.
It is important to keep in mind the nature of the central claim in
Brandom’s account. On one hand, it is essentialist in the sense that to
be a “self” is to be an essentially norm-using creature. To be essentially
norm-using is to be constrained in ways in which freedom is the
7 Brandom makes this crucial point when he draws a distinction between I-Thou and
I-We accounts (1994, 593–601, especially 599).
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necessary result. This banal freedom is reflected at the workaday level
by the fact that originality is the norm rather than the exception in the
most basic acts of human speaking and acting. Even the most con-
certed and perhaps well-trained efforts at exact replications of an
action or performance will be nonidentical and, thus, unique. Of course,
the ethical and political import of expressive freedom (for Brandom and
in Foucault’s later work) becomes actualized only insofar as it is
identified, critically reflected upon, innovated and improvised with,
and expanded. This is what it means for freedom to become aware of
itself as ethical practice. Does this not tie Brandom’s account to a
troublingly teleological claim—a claim that expressive freedom is the
given end of what it means to be human, that humans ought to be able
to pursue that end? Have we finally identified a point at which
Brandom and Foucault must part company? Perhaps not.
In expressive freedom, Brandom agrees with Foucault that one can
never tell in advance from which quarter, or in what forms, innovation
and resistance will come. So understood, the teleological element of
freedom thus “undefined” is intrinsically open-ended. The particular
form of this freedom will be conceived within and in response to
particular social and historical circumstances. The forms it will take,
and precisely how it might press against its antecedent constraints and
concrete circumstances, are impossible to predict beforehand. What it
will entail is the increased agency of the people involved in those
circumstances, as well as their accountability to one another and to the
practices in which they engage. Using the example of linguistic prac-
tices, Brandom describes the increased agency afforded by expressive
freedom as the increased “capacity to transform the vocabularies [and
practices] in which we live and move and have our being” by the
practitioners who use these vocabularies (1985, 178). This is an “open-
ended” telos in the sense that “transforming the vocabularies in which
we live and move and have our being” transforms the particular
conceptions of the telos in question, and thereby “creates new ways of
being” (1985, 178). In other words, the telos of expressive freedom can
be fulfilled only insofar as any particular conception of what the telos
is remains subject to critical assessment, expansion, and revision, and
is, from time to time, rearticulated and transformed. To become an
adept user of a vocabulary (and thus, to fulfill the telos of a language
user, so conceived) is to speak in ways that no one has ever spoken
before, thereby enriching the vocabulary, the practice, (potentially) to
alter the vocabulary itself, and thus, to revising (however subtly) the
telos of the practice as concretely conceived at that point. It is gradu-
ally to be able to formulate and articulate ideas and intentions that
were previously unknown or not possible for the speaker, and perhaps
for the community of speakers. This contributes to what a vocabulary
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is and what it means to be an adept user of a vocabulary. As such,
expressive freedom is “teleological” in a formal sense. Its goal has no
endpoint or form that is not subject to revision or expansion, just as
Armstrong’s mastery of the trumpet redefined what it meant to
“master” the trumpet. Armstrong’s virtuosity at the practice altered
the practice and the normative conceptions organizing it. He exempli-
fied freedom through normative constraint in which the telos of a
practice can be fulfilled only in so far as that telos is simultaneously
challenged, enriched, and transformed.
Of course, the question about revolutionary praxis implied by Lorde’s
claim about dismantling the master’s house remains to be answered. In
contrast to Sartre’s claim to free the self by annihilating the self ’s
oppressor, Brandom’s expressive freedom and Foucault’s self-creation
are both deeply suspicious about claims that a self can ever wholly
“disencumber” and refashion itself from scratch. Likewise, they are both
deeply suspicious of claims that the ground of a given context can be
cleared and entirely reframed. In fact, it is usually the revolutionary
pretensions to accomplish just such conditions—promises of an “abso-
lute emancipation”—that result in the opposite of what they intend.
Foucault remained convinced that it is not sufficient (though
perhaps it is necessary) to simply speak of liberation from repressive
circumstances. “[W]hen a colonized people attempts to liberate itself
from its colonizers, this is indeed a practice of liberation in the strict
sense,” he wrote, “but we know very well . . . that this practice of
liberation is not in itself sufficient to define the practices of freedom
that will still be needed if this people, this society, and these individu-
als are to be able to define admissible and acceptable forms of existence
or political society” (1994, 282–83). Expressive freedom affords an
orientation by which to gauge the development of those practices of
freedom, namely, in the direction of expanded and more encompassing
forms of expressive freedom. These will be marked by the increased
capacities and opportunities of those who had been dominated—or
been denied candidacy as agents for whom expressive freedom was
even possible—to participate in the dismantling of that domination,
refashioning and transforming oppressive conditions.
In my judgment, the resistant and transformative potentials of
expressive freedom do not present one horn of the old revolution/reform
dilemma. Rather, they aid the kind of analysis that might mediate this
dilemma. The best scholarship on slave religion in the United States
has already articulated the standing complexity between reform and
revolution that occurred in that context. In his landmark study, Slave
Religion, Al Raboteau made the case that the roles of slave religion
defy an either/or categorization of resisting/sustaining the status quo
(1978). He writes,
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Institutionally, the egalitarian impulse of evangelical Protestantism,
leveling all men before God and lifting some up to declare his word with
power and authority, gave slaves and free blacks the opportunity to
exercise leadership. Usually this leadership was not revolutionary and
from the perspective of political strategy it was overwhelmingly conser-
vative. Yet political action is not the only measure of resistance to
oppression. Despite political impotence, the black preacher was still a
figure of power as an unmistakable symbol of the talent and ability of
black men, a fact which contradicted the doctrine of inherent black
inferiority. As white slaveholders occasionally recognized, black preach-
ers were anomalous, if not dangerous, persons under the system of slave
control precisely because their authority could not be effectively limited
by whites [1978, 63].
It is this anomalous element characteristic of the black preacher’s
role in that context (among other roles, practices, and institutions) that
most needs analysis.8 This practice became effective as a form of
resistance precisely because it fit easily on neither side of a revolution/
reform antinomy. Nat Turner and John Brown had both led slaves to
rise up against their masters. The perspective of expressive freedom is
compatible with the claim that they were morally justified in doing so
insofar as they employed just and proportionate means. However, in
both cases, revolutionary violence presented a highly manageable form
of resistance. The masters knew precisely how to quash resistance in
that form, and both uprisings were quickly put down by military
responses.
That said, used as a gauge for assessing the acceptability and
deficiency of social arrangements—and thus when and how to chal-
lenge and resist those social and political conditions—expressive
freedom provides grounds for declaring the portions of such structures
that support those conditions deficient and for defying them. Revolu-
tionary activity could not be precluded in principle.9 And yet, what the
term “revolutionary” describes has come to be reconceived within a
framework of expressive freedom. It can no longer be conceived of as
8 I do not have space to extend the present article to include a more detailed analysis
of the roles of slave preachers and black preachers as exemplars of expressive freedom.
The literature on slave religion is mixed on this point, and calls for cautious consider-
ation in light of the framework I am developing here. While Genovese’s assessment is
compatible with Raboteau’s above remarks, Genovese further emphasizes the political
limitations that accompanied the forms of resistance and innovation that slave and black
religion make possible (Genovese 1974, 280–84; West 1997; and West 2002, 32–36).
9 I do not propose to answer this question once and for all in this essay. Richard
Bernstein helpfully frames the conundrum by juxtaposing John Dewey’s faith in the
reformist capacities of critical intelligence to Karl Marx’s claims on behalf of revolution-
ary praxis (1999, 80–81). I do think that the resistant and transformative capacities of
“freedom as ethical practice” provide a means of mediating this dilemma.
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the forever-deferred arrival of a new age (or reinstatement of a previ-
ous epoch) in which all that was is finally overcome with the result of
absolute emancipation. It is, instead, reframed by the recognition that
freedom is an ever-unfinished but ever-possible practical project made
possible by normative constraints presently available, rather than the
absence or alleged eradication of those constraints.10
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